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Art or Propaganda? Dewey and Adorno
on the Relationship between Politics
and Art
WILLIAM S. LEWIS

Skidmore College
Almost every person—even if they seldom articulate or act on this belief—
believes that art is good in an “enriching” type of way, making us better people
and promoting a healthy and free society. Conversely, most people believe that
propaganda is bad because it “impoverishes” our experience, reducing our selves
and our society to one-dimensionality and reducing our freedom. In addition,
almost everybody believes that they can distinguish between art and propaganda.
If it is indeed the case that art enriches our experience and propaganda impoverishes it, then establishing criteria that will allow us to make a distinction between the two would seem a worthwhile exercise, one whose ramifications could
affect the quality of our educational, cultural, political, and spiritual lives. However, there is a problem with making these necessary and potentially beneficial
distinctions and this problem belies the common notion that the difference between propaganda and art is easily visible. When we actually attempt to consider a specific work or body of works in its integrity, according to its form and
content, distinguishing between that which is art and that which is propaganda
is often troublingly difficult.
As an example of this problem, consider the classic “propaganda” film,
Triumph of the Will (1934), directed by Leni Riefenstahl. After numerous screenings in the “Philosophy and Film” course I regularly teach, I have noticed that
my students evince two nearly incommensurable reactions to this documentary
of the National Socialist Party Congress at Nürnberg. One of these reactions is
that of aesthetic arousal and enjoyment. The geometric patterns formed by columns of soldiers, the close-ups in which these soldiers appear as statuary, the
minutiae conveyed by faces in the crowd: all of these masterful shots involve
the film’s viewer in an aesthetic experience that is neither banal nor gratuitous
but satisfying and inspirational. Triumph of the Will—perceived in this first way
as involving the viewer in an experience that is cathartic, fulfilling, and memorable—is enjoyed and experienced as a work of art.
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The other response of my students to a screening of Triumph of the Will is
that of visceral revulsion. It is the feeling inspired by a morally repugnant piece
of propaganda. The events depicted in the film—Hitler’s descent from the sky,
the volks parade, the rhythmic and fevered cries of “Sig Heil”—all these engagingly filmed actions appear absolutely repellent to those whose knowledge of
history demands that they be seen as seeds of World War II and of the Holocaust. Because Triumph of the Will is so artfully executed, the viewers’ feelings
of revulsion towards the film are made even more intense than they would have
been were the picture poorly made.
Even noting these intense feelings of revulsion, there remains my students’ other yet simultaneous reaction to the film: specifically, that it is a great
film and that it can be seen as a work of art. This feeling, and from this feeling
the reasonably unavoidable contention that Triumph of the Will is indeed a work
of art (it is beautiful in its execution, arouses sentiment, provokes contemplation, and offers meaning), stands in uneasy tension with its effectiveness as a
piece of propaganda. Always there remains the question: “How can I be appreciating something that, as a propaganda piece for Nazi ideology, should be and
is loathsome and repellent to me?”
Almost since its debut, critics have been wrestling with the tension caused
by the ambivalent response the film provokes. Most have resolved this tension
by arguing decisively for viewing the film either exclusively as propaganda or
exclusively as art. Critics like Susan Sontag and Siegfried Kracauer contend
that the film is an abhorrent propaganda piece with nice cinematography, whereas
analysts like David Hinton and Andrew Sarris emphasize Riefenstahl’s relative
autonomy from the Nazi propaganda machine and concentrate on the film as a
piece of documentary art.1
This tendency to unequivocally categorize Triumph of the Will—or for
that matter any creative work—as either propaganda or art is not, however, a
productive, revealing, or honest analysis. With such easy categorization the critic
makes two mistakes, both of which lead to the same result. The first is that of
ignoring their original reaction to the work when it appeared singularly neither
as propaganda nor as art but simultaneously as capable of producing aesthetic
awe as well as revulsion. The second mistake follows from the first; it is that of
denying the film’s inherent tensions in order that the piece be derided as propaganda or championed as art. Both of these mistakes close off inquiry and thereby
reify the work as exclusively a work of art or exclusively a work of propaganda.
Once this reification occurs, the possibilities and the problems suggested by the
film’s disclosure that art and propaganda are not in their appearances very far
apart is denied or concealed.
Saying that art and propaganda are akin does not, however, erase the difference between them. Doing so would once again shut off inquiry into the basis
and, indeed, possibility of distinguishing between art and propaganda. Much is
at stake in keeping such questions open, not the least of which is a principled
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defense of the traditional distinction between art and propaganda; as well as
maintaining the power commensurate with this distinction of dignifying and
choosing certain cultural expressions over and against others in terms of their
artistic and cultural worth. Also, if it is the case that good art is productive, or at
least indicative of a good and open society, and that propaganda promotes or
denotes the contrary, then we should seek to distinguish between the two such
that the former be encouraged and the latter discouraged.
Perhaps at this point, it is a good idea to abandon Triumph of the Will as
an example of the difficulty faced in determining the status of a certain work. In
many ways, the discourse surrounding this picture already has overdetermined
it as propaganda.2 But what of those works that we routinely categorize as art
such as the busts of Roman emperors seen in the Metropolitan Museum of Art
or Ingres’ Napoleon I on his Imperial Throne? At their creation, these works
were designed to be seen as monumental representations of imperial power.
They were, in our modern understanding of the term, propaganda pieces. Their
appearance has not changed significantly. Do they now, as museum pieces, appear still as propaganda—the capitalist order’s laudatory monologue about itself having replaced its imperial models—or do they somehow transcend this
category and qualify as art objects? When we extend our discussion about the
status of creative works to those phenomena such as television programs, baseball games, popular music, and fictions, objects which are dignified as art neither by their institutional standing nor by their respective media, the questions
about how and in what way these cultural expressions should be understood and
classified become even more complex and difficult. One is faced not only with
ontological questions about a work’s status but also with critical questions about
the way in which the work actually functions in culture.
In the twentieth century, various attempts have been made to fashion an
aesthetics capable of differentiating between art and propaganda. Certainly the
need for such an aesthetics has been demonstrated over and over again, and not
only by the examples of fascist or so-called totalitarian states. The twin dogmas
of the free market and liberal democracy have been disseminated even more
effectively than the messages of Nationalist Socialism or State Communism. In
this sense, Saving Private Ryan might be seen as bookending a cinematic/propagandistic history of World War II in which Triumph of the Will stands as the
first volume.3
And so the question remains of how to differentiate between those cultural expressions that serve to reinforce the dominant political landscape (whether
this landscape is fascist or liberal democratic) and those suggesting alternative
and better possibilities for social organization. In seeking to answer this question, it may be helpful to look at the work of two philosophers who have thought
extensively about this issue: the German Critical Theorist Theodor Adorno and
the American Pragmatist John Dewey. Anybody who has read these philosophers sees marked differences between them in terms of orientation and atti-
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tude: Dewey is known as a populist, a pluralist, and a guarded optimist, while
Adorno is notorious for his elitism, his dialectical rigor, and his pessimism.
Despite these differences, there is at least one point of convergence: both wish
to make a distinction between real art and “art” that only serves to reify the
dominant political landscape. Further, with the aid of this distinction, both hope
to suggest that real art is the vehicle by which positive political and cultural
change in the direction of true democracy may be occasioned.
What I wish to do, then, through this paper is to articulate the similarities
and differences between Adorno’s and Dewey’s aesthetics, showing the way in
which these theories juxtapose real art against other forms of cultural expression that, in their duplication and strengthening of existing modes of culture,
may be seen as progressively closing off the possibilities for the realization of
true democracy or (what may be the same thing) the end of alienation. Basically, and as the title of this paper suggests, I want to examine how each distinguishes between art and propaganda and to show that, despite obvious differences
between their philosophies taken as a whole, they are not so far apart in their
aesthetic judgments of what the art object is and what effect it has or may have
on individuals and society. Furthermore, though sympathetic to the main thrust
of Adorno’s and Dewey’s aesthetics and wishing to acknowledge as correct and
useful both the distinction they make between art and propaganda and the judgment they make about the potential effects of each type of production on society, I wish to distance my own consideration of the relationship between art and
politics from the conclusion that each draws from their respective analyses: that
art is or can be productive of democracy. Specifically, this will take the form of
a critique of Dewey’s faith in the ability of art to reach a mass audience and to
allow real public opinion. Similarly, it will involve a critique of Adorno’s argument that art’s autonomy from culture is potentially emancipative and productive of democratic practices. The positive part of this articulation of my own
view of the relation between art and politics will, I am afraid, not in fact be very
positive. I will argue against both Dewey and Adorno that even were genuine or
real artistic expressions to appear, there is no way in which these might sustain
themselves otherwise than as private pleasures or as products whose potential
powers to change and open the political realm have been vitiated by their
commodification.
So that “real art” and its effects on the political/cultural sphere might be
better understood, it is perhaps best to start out with a comparison between
Adorno’s and Dewey’s analyses of what they each believe to be the relation
between subjects and cultural productions: that is, between people and art. Heirs
to Hegel, each philosopher acknowledges that subjects are products of the culture they inhabit. For Adorno, however, the cultural production of subjects is
understood to be much more monolithic than it is for Dewey. This is so even if
Adorno’s critique of identity and sophisticated understanding of dialectic disallows an easy reductionism.4 In this, Adorno is—for the most part—willing to
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follow Marx in maintaining that all cultural formations (including subjects) are
the result of specific modes of production (Adorno 1997a, 10). For his part,
Dewey does not totally reject Marx’s insight and in fact does argue that a culture’s
mode of production has much to do with the form that that culture and its subjects take (Dewey 1939, 13). However, he also believes that humans as naturally evolved, conscious, intelligent beings capable of moral choice have some
control in determining the way in which they and their cultural institutions are
formed. For Dewey, the richness of experience and of human nature is difficult
to hide, even under the cover of ideology.
Dewey presents the world as ontologically rich and as capable of intelligent appreciation and even direction despite the presence of forces—economic
and otherwise—that tend to encourage slavishness, discipline, and uniformity
in the subjects that are affected by them (Dewey 1927, 49). However, insofar as
these forces create subjects who are incapable of participating in the democratic
process for lack of real and useful knowledge, he also believes that these forces
are a very real problem and that they are detrimental—if not totally anathema—
to the project of democracy.
A large part of these external forces’ efficacy, Dewey points out, is predicated on their ability to control a culture’s communication and, thereby, the
individual subject’s understanding, including self-understanding. This control
of communication in the service of dominant interests is identifiable by its narrowing of possible discourses and its offering up of the “same few and relatively simple beliefs asseverated to be ‘Truths’ as the whole truth of experience”
(Dewey 1939, 44). This narrow and one-dimensional communication, which
occludes the ontological richness of our experience, Dewey terms “propaganda.”
He argues that the production and dissemination of such material is itself constitutive of mass opinion, an opinion that is necessarily as dogmatic as its inspiration (Dewey 1939, 38; 1927, 181). As the dissemination of propaganda becomes
more and more the norm and mass opinion usurps or precludes the possibility of
rich, diverse, and free public opinion, Dewey contends that the chances for the
realization of democratic subjects and democratic culture are progressively being ceded to the easy and horrible promise of totalitarianism (Dewey 1939, 10).
Unlike Dewey, for whom there exists a rich world and a potentially rich
culture that is in the process of being eclipsed by propaganda and mass opinion,
there is no outside to the banal culture that Adorno identifies as the product of
late capitalism. If there is one dominant theme in Adorno’s work in relation to
“mass culture” or the “culture industry,” it is that the culture industry—which
constitutes the whole of contemporary American culture—creates its own ontology (Adorno 1989a, 10). The culture industry and the products or “artworks”
that it develops then must be understood as a part of this closed system. The
subjects who inhabit the landscape defined by the culture industry are constituted by and in relation to the products it produces for them. Its boundaries
determine what they are able to know, desire, and experience. As Adorno ex-
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plains this relationship, the culture industry “tolerates no deviation and incessantly drills in the same formulas of behavior ... [and it] arouses a feeling of
well-being that the world is precisely in that order suggested by the culture
industry” (134). The individuals of the culture industry are then not so much
subjects as they are the objects of economic interests. They are consumers, compelled and controlled by a force that is outside of them. And, just as Dewey
points out that the force of propaganda progressively impoverishes its subjects
and makes them unfit for democracy, Adorno points out that the culture industry
“impedes the development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge
and decide for themselves, [qualities that] would be the precondition for a democratic society” (135).
For both Dewey and Adorno, real art is contrasted with propaganda. In
addition, real art is seen by both as catalyst and vehicle for the realization of a
much richer and democratic political life . This is not to say that Dewey’s and
Adorno’s ideas of what art is and what its effects may be are exactly the same.
Given the differences between their accounts of the relationship among world,
economic-political system and subjects illustrated above, this simply could not
be the case. However, at the level of its effects, each holds out art as hope and
promise, even if this promise is proffered from two very different perspectives.
For Dewey, art is understood to put us into and to make us more fully
aware of the richness of our relationships with life and culture, thereby rendering us more capable of informed choice and ameliorative political action. For
Adorno, art suggests an alternative to the banal culture that we now inhabit and
promises new forms of freedom. Allow me to start with Adorno to illustrate and
then to somewhat complicate this point. Adorno maintains that all art, including
real art and banal art, is a cultural production and that we can read culture through
it (Adorno 1997b, 17). The great majority of artistic productions, though, can
only be seen as artifacts: as objects that merely reproduce, in a quite vulgar way,
the dominant mode of production. This is as true of folk art objects from the past
as it is of the products of today’s culture industry (Adorno 1978, 204). The
culture industry might attempt to disguise this relation—even going so far as to
dress up its creations as real art—but it is only because this disguise allows it to
push more product (207). Good examples of this strategy can be found in any
IKEA catalog where mass-produced objects designed to meet a manufactured
need are attributed to a single, named designer and limited in their production
runs so as to stimulate consumption.
The great majority of a culture’s productions, Adorno argues, are artifacts. Artifactual status is thus not limited to Swedish furniture but extends all
the way from Dale Earnhardt memento mori to The Matrix: Reloaded. However, even given the fact that almost all artistic productions in late modernity are
artifacts and thus are essentially reproductive, Adorno acknowledges that real
art objects can still be produced. The principal difference between these exceedingly rare art objects and artifacts is that, unlike artifacts that exist merely to
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satisfy the artificially produced desires of the consumer, art objects actually
resist the consumer’s or subject’s consumption of them (Adorno 1997b, 10).
Real artworks stand as autonomous objects, disrupting their would-be consumer’s
desire to devour them as commodities.5 By stating that the work of art stand as
an autonomous object, Adorno is not aligning himself exactly with Kant. Yes,
he does insist upon the radical autonomy of the art object; but he also insists that
this object—just like any other product of human technique—is the product and
result of culture and of history; it was not originally without interest. As Adorno
explains it, the art object is different from the artifact because it has a dialectical
quality. The art object is, on the one hand, “a product of social labor” (5) and
thus cannot escape its relation to the organization of society (Adorno 1978, 214).
On the other hand, the art object must be seen as autonomous because its form
cannot be reduced to an expression of a culture’s mode of production but is,
instead, something unique to and controlling of itself.
This, then, is the dual status of the artwork: it is, like the artifact, a product of culture but it is also, in its integrity, different from the culture that produced it. However, to fully understand the art object dialectically is to understand
it in terms of its concept. For Adorno, this means understanding it in history. It
is true, he maintains, that art objects did not always possess the autonomy they
now enjoy. However, coincident with the Enlightenment’s progressive emancipation of the subject, the artwork likewise gained in autonomy. Though art is
social because of its relation to the mode of production, it is also (and much
more importantly) social because of its opposition to society: real art is ruled by
its own form, not by that of society (Adorno 1997b, 225). Art’s journey to autonomy is too complex to treat here. However, this dual nature of the art object—that it is simultaneously product of society and opposed to society in its
autonomy—is that which gives it, for Adorno, its revolutionary potential. Real
art, as opposed to the culture industry’s productions (of which propaganda is
one instance), does not merely replicate the form of the dominant mode of production in which every thing is “heteronomously defined” and accepted immediately as fitting into the commodified landscape. Instead, real art is ruled by its
own internal definition, which is different (and better) than the culture industry’s.
Because it is created in and as freedom, it asserts its own identity and particularity. As Adorno puts it in dialectic doublespeak: “art’s asociality is the determinate negation of a determinate society” (225).
It is in its asociality that art is seen as potentially liberatory: because it
exists as a different and better order than the dominant order it is able to suggest
a different order to its audience. However, this asociality and its commensurate
power are identified by Adorno as possessed only by a very small percentage of
artistic products. True art must be new—that is, different from the productions
of the culture industry and the traditions that the culture industry has co-opted—
but it must not be new in the sense of fashion in which only the outward appearance is changed. Thus neoclassical and fickle avant-garde gestures are
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immediately excluded from Adorno’s realm of real art. Likewise, following
Benjamin, tradition’s liberatory potential is seriously cast into doubt. What remains for Adorno is “genuine modern art,” art measured by its negativity, by its
“ever more complex rejections” of the dominant modes of expression” (Adorno
1973, 10). The hope for this real art is that, in its autonomy and complexity of
form, it might serve as an example of another, better and potentially utopian
way in which life may be lived (Adorno1997b, 9). This will be a life that is not
constituted and fulfilled by the vacuous demands of the culture industry. Art for
Adorno is the outside and negation of the banal ontology of capitalism and its
incessant and accelerating reproduction.
As was pointed out above, Dewey’s social ontology is much richer than
Adorno’s. Whereas Adorno thinks that the way in which we know the world is
almost totally informed by our culture’s modes of production, Dewey is sure
that we can enjoy a much richer experience of the world and that, through science and art, this richness can be revealed. Further, his hope is that, through this
revelation, we can see our way to the creation of truly democratic institutions
that are both reflective and productive of this understanding. A brief exposition
of what art objects are for Dewey, how they transcend the status of propaganda,
and the way in which their status relates to the unleashing of democratic potential may serve to clarify this point. For Dewey, art objects are a special class of
aesthetic expressions. An aesthetic object is a specific ordering of experience
that is appreciated for and gives pleasure by its perceived status as a summation
of lived experience. The aesthetic object functions by representing an explicit
and achieved equilibrium between an individual or a culture and the world, which
is able to be understood and appreciated by the object’s spectator. It is sedimented
and interpreted experience. Not in contrast but in addition to its aesthetic functioning, the art object goes beyond merely representing the consummatory and
ordered, and succeeds in representing the whole process of this achievement. As
Dewey writes: “art, in its form, unites the very same relation of doing and undergoing, outgoing and incoming energy that makes an experience to be an experience” (Dewey 1934, 48).
The difference between the aesthetic and the artistic can be likened to the
distinction that Adorno makes between the products of the culture industry and
real art: it is the difference between monological and dialectical objects. In aesthetic experience “an object interpenetrated with meanings is given, [in it] tendencies are sensed as brought to fruition” (Dewey 1958, 374). Being a singular
voice that speaks a truth about the conclusion of a particular series of events, the
given, formed, and final aesthetic object is like a statement. It is raw experience
digested and formed; it is perceived as a terminus and communicated as a monologue. As a beautiful cup or a well-designed chair represent solutions to certain
problems of experience, those of thirst and repose, each is such a monologue. In
that they also express certain crafted solutions to problems of experience, Nazi
propaganda films like Triumph of the Will are also aesthetic objects.
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The artistic object, in that it is also an aesthetic object, is a terminus.
However, it is not a final terminus. Instead, art represents the conclusion and
interpretation of an experience while simultaneously communicating suggestions about new experience. Art “grasps tendencies as possibilities.” Because
the art object is never an ultimate statement but instead extends an invitation to
the creation and achievement of further meanings, its existence and effect is
dialogical and is never finished (374). The dialogical function of art—its role as
translator between experience and experiencer—is what makes it productive of
new perceptions and new meanings. Excellent art thus reveals the full richness
of an experience and points forward to the next one.
Because Dewey’s real art, as opposed to merely aesthetic objects, exceeds the consummatory and yields the causally productive, it can, like Adorno’s
real art, inform and liberate subsequent action. Given the ability of art to give
form to past experience as well as its capacity to suggest multiple possibilities
for future action, art, as Dewey says, does appear to be an ideal communicative
vehicle, one that could inform a democratic and free public if only its appearances could be recognized and encouraged. As such, the existence of art provides a real alternative to propaganda if it could succeed in touching and informing
subjects at a deeper level. And, indeed, Dewey does believe that art can reach
this deeper level because, if done well, it “breaks through the crust of conventionalized consciousness” (Dewey 1927, 183) and allows real and relevant information about our experience—in all its richness—to be revealed.
Art, because it communicates instead of just dictates, presents itself for
Dewey as a solution to the problem of how to present information that exceeds
the “asseverated Truths” proffered by propaganda, by aesthetic productions that
endlessly repeat the same and thereby reinforce existing structures. Art for Dewey
is not just the ideal vehicle for communication, it is the ideal of communication.
It allows one to communicate one’s lived experience fully and to suggest new
possibilities for experience. Further, art understood as an ideal of communication informs the very possibility of a community’s self-awareness. The existence of an artistic culture is thus the necessary prerequisite for a democratic and
free culture to come into its own. As Dewey writes, “the arts are not adornments
of culture but things in whose enjoyment all should partake if democracy is to
be a reality” (Dewey 1939, 9).
At least as Dewey conceptualizes democracy from the standpoint of society as the “liberation of the potentialities of members of a group in harmony
with the interests and goods which are common [to it],” his argument that art
must be understood as a basic requirement for democratic culture is, I think, a
valid one (Dewey 1927, 147). This is true insofar as meaningful communication—of the sort only art can convey—is a prerequisite for any such community
to understand its common interests (152). With some reservation, I might even
follow Dewey and grant his exceptional claim that true art—inasmuch as it is
the reflection of experience—demands democracy. However, I am reluctant to
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do so because I recognize that Adorno is much more accurate than Dewey in his
depiction of late capitalist culture as something that endlessly reproduces itself
and whose products, demanding less work on the part of their consumer than
real art, are the only way in which the culture knows itself and its possibilities
(or lack thereof). Difficult messages—those that are both consummatory and
revelatory—simply cannot be digested and understood by the overwhelming
majority of the population. Most seek and desire only the consummatory and
these are supplied in abundance by the culture industry. That which does not
provide immediate fulfillment of partially articulated desires is rejected. “Conventionalized consciousness,” Dewey’s derisory phrase for the great mass of
human being’s superficial opinions and judgments, is comfortable consciousness; and it may indeed be an illusion that masks a deeper underlying ontological richness. However, as long as there is no immediate need, as long as the
world can be kept at a distance, artworks that portray an occluded or merely
different world will also be kept at a distance. The work of creating real public
opinion through the creation and dissemination of art is not ever entertained as
an option.
In the above critique, I place my own views closer to those of Adorno
regarding the relationship between art and politics than I do to those of Dewey.
However, what I wrote in the last paragraph probably does not deserve the status of critique because I fundamentally agree with Dewey about what art should
be and only disagree with him about its potential. In point of fact, I do not even
think that there is that great a difference between Adorno’s and Dewey’s definitions of real art nor between the distinction that can be made, using these definitions, between art and propaganda. What seems their chief disparity—Adorno’s
art object’s radical autonomy from culture and experience versus Dewey’s insistence that the art object be seen as revelatory of experience—is collapsed by
the realization that the autonomy of which Adorno speaks for the art object just
means that it is different from the hollow forms created by the culture industry.
In this difference it (just like Dewey’s art object) reveals something richer than
an easily digestible lie that comfortably fits into the crust of conventionalized
consciousness. So then, I would argue that both philosophers are narrowly correct in their identification of what art is or what art might be: art is human fashioned objects that point to new ways of relating to our selves, our society, and
our world and that do not repeat or compound the problems of late modernity.
Propaganda, by way of contrast, is artistic products that limit the ways in which
we relate to our selves, our society, and our world.
In that most objects produced today circumscribe our experience rather
than enrich it or suggest new modes of experiencing, the great majority of contemporary human production may rightly be placed in the latter category. Despite, then, my fundamental agreement with both philosophers about what true
art is and how it can be distinguished from propaganda, I tend to place my own
views more fully on Adorno’s side in regard to the potential effect of art on
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politics because of his insistence that real art is difficult and that it is not easily
communicated. But even difficult art, Adorno would insist, is possibly liberatory
and productive of democracy. Given his own terms and protests to the contrary,
though, I do not understand how this could be the case. Adorno fervently wishes
to believe that art is a “determinate negation,” that it reveals a different order
than that produced by the culture industry (Adorno and Horkheimer 1994, 24,
18). As such, it promises to be is a real move away from the culture industry and
toward real freedom and real democracy (Adorno 1989a, 135). However, a move
to novelty is not necessarily a move to democracy and does not guarantee freedom. Art, Adorno maintains, is specifically not for everybody; it is difficult and
it requires leisure and intelligence to be able to understand it. If one was to take
Adorno’s idea of perfect form, newness, and autonomy and to, say, apply it to
the city of Paris, one might end up with something like Le Corbusier’s Plan
Voisin: a rational construct that little satisfies the needs of a real public and the
creation would require that tremendous violence be visited on that public for its
realization. I realize that this is all in line with a certain tradition of Marxism but
it does not necessarily seem compatible with democracy understood as rule by
the many for the common good or freedom understood as self-determination of
individuals and communities.
Yet I am still drawn to Adorno’s aesthetics, especially as it is presented in
his later works. In these, he marks out a space for art that does not make of it a
vulgar vehicle for democratic enlightenment. Instead, he confines it to a very
elite, if not strictly personal, sphere. This tendency is particularly evident in
Minima Moralia, but is perhaps more accessible through his writings on jazz.
Many seem to revile these texts (Nye 1998, 69–73), but I find them particularly
illuminative of the status of art in late capitalism. Though he may overstate his
case out of ignorance of the variety of forms that jazz took at the middle of the
twentieth century, Adorno correctly specifies that most jazz and other popular
musical forms only act out the drama of individuality and freedom to sell a
product (Adorno 1989b, 201). For this, he rightfully castigates it. Adorno, however, demands more of art than just seeming to be free: he demands that it be
free. He thus dismisses jazz as art because the jazz of which he was aware was
formulaic in both production and consumption. However, according to him, so
was most classical music, the difference between the two genres being that classical music follows traditional formulas and jazz formulates false novelty.
But what about Lester Young, Albert Ayler, or Ornette Coleman? Mustn’t
these musicians in their innovation and integrity at least represent true jazz and
real art? Well, they probably do achieve this level and if you had a few spare
minutes and could convince Adorno to come over to your apartment to listen to
some records you could probably convince him that what he was hearing was
indeed art, that it does more than repeat and reinforce cultural norms. It is even
possible that he might derive some pleasure from this listening and recognize
that the music in its autonomy and radical freedom represents the possibility of
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liberation from the vulgar ontology of the culture industry. However, it is also
true that, insofar as these or any other true artistic expressions become popular
and become commodified, the tensions inherent in the work are ignored and
lost.6 Think of the transitions from Malcom X’s rhetoric to Malcom X baseball
caps, from Schönberg’s Farben in 1911 as Adorno heard it to the Farben one
hears as transition music during National Public Radio’s “All Things Considered.” It may be possible to recover novelty and tension in a great work, but this
takes effort. It is so much easier to consume it like a philistine. This makes it
functionally no better than propaganda, though at a formal level—as I have
argued—such a distinction can be made. Dewey’s point that the world is rich
and that it demands art that is able to explain and embody this richness may be
a correct one. That such art might exist I may even grant. Its liberatory and
progressive political potential, however, I would cast into doubt. The contemporary palate has been fed so long on pablum that it cannot stomach difficult
works except as commodities that have been vetted and digested for them in
advance.
Notes
1. See Sontag 1975; Kracauer 1947, 29; Hinton 1978; and Sarris 1996, 45.
2. It is hard now not to see Leni Riefenstahl’s film as the first half of a double bill with Alan
Resnais’ Night and Fog rounding out the matinee. Observe, for instance, that Ray Müller chose in
his documentary The Wonderful, Horrible Life of Leni Riefenstahl (Germany, 1993) to splice concentration camp footage into his interviews with Riefenstahl and clips of her films.
3. For insights regarding the audience reception of Triumph of the Will and other films
mentioned in this article, I am indebted to students in my “Philosophy and Film” courses at The
Pennsylvania State and Georgetown Universities. Instrumental also in shaping the final form of
the piece were professors at Skidmore College who heard this paper presented in their spring 2000
series of colloquia; and John Stuhr and Vincent Colapietro, who made suggestions about the paper
in its various drafts.
4. For Adorno’s critique of identity see Dews 1989, 1–22. On this critique’s relation to subjectivity and politics, see Schoolman 1997, 57–92.
5. For extended considerations of the autonomy of the art object, see Harding 1992, 83–195;
Hohendahl 1981, 133–48.
6. Adorno certainly notices this problem. For instance, in Dialectic of Enlightenment he notes
that the “use value” of art (that which it actually does by virtue of its autonomy) is lost and replaced by its exchange value (that which it can sell for) because it was previously valued in culture
(Adorno and Horkheimer 1994, 158).
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